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Friday, August 26, 2011

TSB Report: Inflight Fire and Precautionary Landing - Sundance Balloon

Transportation Safety Board Report: Inflight Fire and Precautionary Landing - Sundance Balloon

The hot air balloon (registration C-GDCG) operated by Sundance Balloons (2008) Ltd., launched at approximately 19:25 Eastern Daylight Time from Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, for a local flight.
On board were the pilot and 12 passengers. While over the city at approximately 700 feet above ground level the balloon encountered turbulence. The pilot initiated a descent with the intention of executing a precautionary landing. The balloon's rate of descent increased unexpectedly, and the pilot had to light all 3 burners to arrest the descent. During this time the lower portion of the balloon's envelope collapsed into the path of the burner flame. Some of the lower envelope panels caught fire, but self-extinguished once the flame was removed. The balloon's basket struck the tops of some trees, and then the balloon climbed to approximately 1000 feet. The pilot then executed another descent to land. The balloon struck trees during the landing, and subsequently came to rest in a residential area of Ottawa at about 20:00.

Sundance Balloons (2008) Ltd. operates over 25 balloons nationwide. The occurrence balloon was registered and operated by Sundance Balloons (2008) Ltd. The company was authorized to carry fare-paying passengers by Transport Canada (TC) by way of a Special Flight Operations Certificate (SFOC). 

Although the SFOC states that it certifies that the balloon operator is adequately equipped and able to conduct a safe balloon operation carrying fare-paying passengers, there is no oversight program in place to assure that standards are maintained once the SFOC is issued. Balloon operators are not regulated under Part VII (Commercial Air Services) of the Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs). Unlike most air operators carrying fare-paying passengers in Canada, balloon operators will not be subject to TC's requirement for Safety Management Systems (SMS).

Records indicate that the hot air balloon was certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with existing regulations and approved procedures. The analysis focuses on the weather, the pilot's decision making, and company procedures and regulations.

The forecast obtained by the pilot that afternoon indicated suitable weather for the planned flight. Prior to take-off, the pilot discussed the cloud conditions with another pilot and was satisfied that the flight would be conducted in favourable weather conditions. The 1900 hourly weather indicated towering cumulus in the vicinity. It is likely that the turbulence that prompted the pilot to initiate a precautionary landing was associated with these clouds.

A high sink rate developed during the initial landing attempt, requiring the pilot to use maximum available power to arrest the descent. During this descent, the bottom of the balloon envelope came into contact with the burner flame, igniting some of the panels. The balloon contacted trees just as the influx of hot air took effect and the balloon rapidly ascended. The pilot turned the burners off during the ascent and the balloon material self-extinguished.

During the second landing attempt, the pilot was concerned about controlling the balloon in the turbulence as well as the condition of the balloon envelope. This influenced the decision to land in the residential area rather than prolong the flight to a more suitable site.

As the balloon was in its second descent for landing, the passengers were advised to assume the position described during the pre-flight briefing. This position was consistent with the company operations manual (COM); however, it was not suited for this specific landing emergency. There is no current requirement under CARs for balloon operators to produce a COM;  if the operator chooses to provide one as a best practice, such a COM would benefit from specific procedures for emergency landings. There is a risk that passengers may be injured because they are not properly prepared.

It was only during the second landing attempt that the pilot advised ATS of his situation and intentions. The pilot declined emergency assistance when it was offered by ATS because he saw the emergency response vehicles on the ground following the balloon. Had these vehicles been dispatched for another event, then the emergency response to the balloon would have been delayed.

After the balloon landed on a lawn in a residential area, a conflict arose between local emergency services and the pilot as to the procedure and time to evacuate the passengers. Without adequate information, emergency response units may not take appropriate steps to safeguard passengers, the public and property.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors

  1. The flight encountered localized turbulence that prompted the pilot to initiate a precautionary landing. A high sink rate developed during this initial landing attempt requiring the pilot to use maximum available power to arrest the sink rate.
  2. During this descent, the bottom of the balloon envelope came into contact with the burner flame, igniting some of the panels. As the balloon climbed in response to the influx of hot air, the pilot turned the burners off which allowed the balloon envelope material to self-extinguish.
  3. During the second landing attempt, the pilot was concerned about controlling the balloon in the turbulence and the condition of the balloon envelope. This influenced the decision to land in the residential area rather than prolong the flight to a more suitable site.
Ottawa Citizen Photo

Chris Ziraldo Photo

Jonathon Kuhn Photo

Ottawa Citizen Photo

Ottawa Citizen Photo

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